

paid sex is ineradicable and concentrate on keeping the business clean, safe and inconspicuous. Prostitution is not going to go away and it needs to be taken care of.

Angela DeBlasio: Many people know that prostitution is illegal, but they find that they have sexual needs. They know they can't get a prostitute, so they try and pick up fellow workers, which brings up sexual harassment. The United States holds a huge sexual harassment problem. Sexual harassment is one of the fastest expanding areas of American law.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which handles sexual harassment complaints, in 1991 handled over 6,000 cases, and in 1997 close to 16,000. If prostitution was legal and open for business, would there be any reason for sexual harassment cases?

Kayla Gildersleeve: One would wonder, if prostitution is going on anyway, why legalize it? The answer is simple. If prostitution is legalized, then the government would be in charge, and there would be great protection from diseases and violence. Also, there wouldn't be any unprotected prostitutes on the streets, and they would get paid, not the pimps.

Tess Grossi: Prostitution has been a part of life throughout history, and what would make the government think that making it illegal will stop it? The sex industry is exposed to many of the forces that normal businesses must contend with, but will it ever become a normal and respected part of society? History suggests that it might. Throughout history, there have been all forms of prostitution, including legal prostitution.

Again, prostitution causes deadly diseases to spread more rapidly, and there is great violence and inhumanity involved. All of these problems can be eradicated if the government would legalize it. The government is the only answer to solving the problem. Prostitution will never go away. Therefore, the government should legalize prostitution.

Lynn Clough: The people and the prostitutes are afraid to go to the government for help, and so the government needs to go to them.

Thank you.

WARREN VILLAGE IN DENVER, COLORADO IS AN INNOVATIVE AND UNIQUE FAMILY SERVICE COMMUNITY

HON. SCOTT MCINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 26, 1999

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize one of Colorado's most innovative and unique family service communities, Warren Village in Denver, Colorado. Warren Village is a service created to help low-income single-parents move from public assistance to personal and economic self-sufficiency through subsidized housing, on-site child care, counseling, and education, or job training.

Warren Village was established in 1974, marking July as the institution's 25th anniversary. Upon establishment, Warren Village was the Nation's first federally subsidized transitional housing program for single-parent families. Founders of Warren Village included Warren United Methodist Church, the U.S. Depart-

ment of Housing and Urban Development, and local business leaders.

Warren Village provides three integrated programs to its residents. The housing program provides accommodations for families of up to four children and one adult. The Learning Center uses a multi-cultural and gender-fair curriculum for at-risk urban children. The Family Services Program provides comprehensive case-management, vocational assessment, and life classes on topics ranging from goal achievement, to parenting, and leadership opportunities.

Residents of Warren Village are required to participate in activities that include evening educational classes, volunteer services, and must attend school or work full time. These activities must be completed as a condition of their lease agreement; progress of each resident is monitored quarterly. Residence at Warren Village is not an entitlement, but rather a privilege to be earned by personal progress.

Warren Village is a nonprofit organization that has more than 1,500 active community volunteers from schools, businesses, youth groups, and churches. In 1998, Warren Village had over 1,800 unduplicated volunteers donate their time. The limited financial resources of the institution are supplemented by the time and remarkable talents of these volunteers.

Over the past 25 years, Warren Village has received numerous national and State honors and awards for its outstanding services to the Denver Metro area. Warren Village has become a national model for providing constructive solutions for serious issues that plague every community in the Nation. With more than 2,500 families graduated from the program, cities across the country have replicated the Warren Village model.

I would like to congratulate Warren Village on 25 years of remarkable service and outstanding dedication to the community of Denver, as well as the State of Colorado. The hard work and significant achievements of Warren Village exemplify the notion of public service and civic duty. Colorado is both honored and extremely fortunately to have such an effective agency derive from our State.

COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1999 (H.R. 2607)

HON. DANA ROHRABACHER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 26, 1999

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce the Commercial Space Transportation Competitiveness Act of 1999.

Last year, the American people learned that two U.S. companies had helped Communist China improve its Long March launch vehicles. And we've all heard about the immediate and long-term impacts this is having on our national security.

But this travesty was merely the symptom of a greater challenge. In Communist China, we have a ruthless dictatorship that is using commercial space activities to help its military someday compete with the United States. In America, however, we have a space transpor-

tation industry that has grown up as an extension of the government, and therefore hasn't been dynamic enough to meet the launch needs of our vibrant commercial satellite industry. Sadly, these two facts created the circumstances that led to the technology transfers we have learned about.

Ever since I entered Congress over a decade ago I have championed the issue of improving America's space transportation capabilities. With leadership and support from colleagues like my late friend George Brown, the Committee on Science has reported, won House passage, and seen enactment of several legislative initiatives over the past decade. The legislation I am introducing today is another significant step towards the goal stated by the Select Committee led by CHRIS COX and NORM DICKS; improving U.S. "space launch capacity and competition."

The aerospace industry—along with the FAA—has testified before the Space & Aeronautics Subcommittee on ways to improve U.S. launch competitiveness. The message we have heard loud-and-clear is that their top priority is the renewal of the government-industry risk sharing plan known as "indemnification." Mr. Speaker, this bill extends indemnification authority for a full 5 years beyond its scheduled expiration this December.

I do wish, however, that we had more time to fully consider this issue. Industry has been signing launch contracts for nearly 3 years that presupposed an automatic renewal. With little time for debate about whether this is the right risk sharing plan for the future, the Science Committee was put in a tough spot that I for one don't want to see repeated in 5 years.

So this bill also directs that various government agencies and industry sectors present Congress with the broadest possible range of ideas as to whether and how this risk sharing regime should change in the future. Make no mistake about this: we want to give U.S. industry a stable business environment so they can be more competitive in the international marketplace. However, we also want to start the process now of planning for risk sharing in 2005 and beyond.

This legislation authorizes funding through Fiscal Year 2002 for the FAA's Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation. Over the past two years, Patti Grace Smith has dramatically reformed and improved this office. She and her staff have worked hard to keep up with rapid growth in U.S. commercial space transportation, while drafting regulations to help industry move forward into the era of reusable launch vehicles. For these reasons, we have provided this office with a steady increase in funding over the next 3 years.

The other non-user agency that works with the commercial space transportation industry is the Office of Space Commercialization (OSC) within the Department of Commerce. Last year the Congress created this office in law, and this bill provides OSC with steady funding but requires the office to lay out more specific programmatic objectives and results so the Congress can judge its progress.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to offer this legislation to help make America's commercial

space transportation industry more competitive. I want to thank Science Committee Chairman JIM SENSENBRENNER for his help and encouragement in developing this bill. I would also like to thank Chairmen JOHN MCCAIN and BILL FRIST in the Senate, and also Senator JOHN BREAUX, for actively focusing on commercial space transportation issues. We look forward to joining with them soon to send a mutually agreeable version of this legislation to the White House for the President's signature.

TRADE POLICY REFORM ACT

HON. JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 26, 1999

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, our foreign competitors have been dumping steel in America below market value for well over a year. This practice, which has been allowed to continue unencumbered by the Clinton Administration, has had a devastating effect on the U.S. steel industry and U.S. steelworkers. I have taken numerous actions, alone and in conjunction with the Congressional Steel Caucus, to urge the Administration to change its backward trade policy and remedy the current crisis. In March, the House passed the Bipartisan Steel Recovery Act, which imposes quotas on steel imports above a certain level, for three years. Short-term solutions, however, are not a panacea. In order to rebuild the confidences of American industry and the American worker in the international trading system—and particularly in U.S. trade policy—Congress should reform three major trade law regimes: (1) enforcement of international trade agreements, (2) remedies against disruptive import surges, and (3) remedies against foreign unfair trade practices.

There is an urgent need to strengthen Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which was enacted to enable the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to open foreign markets closed to imported products and services by unreasonable trade barriers. The effectiveness of Section 301 has been significantly undermined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the emergence of new, harder-to-reach forms of foreign trade barriers. Section 301 now serves almost exclusively as a mechanism by which complaints are funneled through the USTR en route to the WTO. The bilateral component of U.S. trade diplomacy has been allowed to decay. The WTO has been ineffectual in dealing with modern, complex trade issues such as the closure of foreign markets by governments working with private monopolies and cartels (e.g. *Kodak v. Fuji*). Title I of the Trade Policy Reform Act would reinstate this bilateral component of U.S. trade diplomacy and require new reporting requirements by the Office of U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to Congress. These new reporting requirements: (1) make the USTR more accountable to Congress, and (2) provide for direct information dissemination to Congress, in order to improve Congressional oversight, and (3) address both market access barriers and foreign compliance

with international accords. The "Trade Policy Reform Act" also mandates appropriate action by the Commerce Department when market access barriers or non-compliance with trade accords is found.

Specifically, Title I requires monitoring of and reports on foreign market access for U.S. goods and services, negotiations to gain market access, progress reports on negotiations, monitoring of compliance with trade agreements, and 301 actions should negotiations fail or should countries refuse to negotiate or in the case of noncompliance with agreements. The Trade Policy Reform Act would also bring the National Trade Estimates (NTE) report closer to Congress' original goals and address current illegal trade practices such as prison labor, etc. The NTE is further amended to include input by affected U.S. industries and their employees. Congress devised the NTE in the 1980s to inventory, on an annual basis, foreign trade barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services. The purpose was to bring about negotiations to eliminate such barriers. The list today does not serve its intended function.

With respect to relief from unfair trade practices, Title II of the Trade Policy Reform Act mandates action by the USTR, for the first time, against collaborations between foreign governments and private enterprises to restrict market access for U.S. goods and services by making such collaborations actionable. Moreover, the legislation would allow any interested party, defined as one who has been economically adversely affected, to request a review of country compliance with any trade agreement. Non-compliance is actionable.

In addition, Title II would prohibit the Secretary of Commerce from using any funds appropriated by Congress to implement existing agreements and negotiate any new ones for those categories of steel included in H.R. 975, the Bipartisan Steel Recovery Act. Section 2106 also directs the Secretary to withdraw from the current agreements and notify the other signatories of that action.

Title III of the Trade Policy Reform Act would abolish the International Trade Commission and transfer its authority and responsibilities to the Department of Commerce. The ITC's continued independence and existence outside of any institution accountable to the people of the United States undermines America's industry and hurts America's workers. The ITC's independence is precisely what makes it the least appropriate body to determine whether U.S. industries are being injured by imports and what relief those industries should be given. America's workers deserve to have an agency on their side, protecting their interests, with their security and success its primary goal. Although the ITC Commissioners are confirmed by the Senate, Congress has no other role whatsoever in its oversight (other than appropriating its operating funds).

When the ITC purports to not be a policy-making body, it really means that it does not follow American policy, just its own. The ITC's policy clearly places the concerns of foreign industries on the same plateau as our own industries, and American workers suffer. Furthermore, the ITC contradicts itself. On one hand it claims to be an independent agency that conducts objective studies on international

trade. On the other hand the ITC is required to assist the President, making recommendations on how to relieve industries injured by increasing exports, and advising him on whether agriculture imports interfere with governmental price support programs. In filling these dual roles, the ITC is the equivalent of a referee that makes calls in a game while coaching his team from the sidelines. The Commissioners of the ITC are supposed to serve the American people. The American worker does not need a coach that is also required to fill the role of "objective" referee. An agency like the ITC cannot entirely fulfill its duties. Title III will abolish this problematic agency, transfer its authority to the Department of Commerce, and in doing so fill the much-needed role of a trade agency that successfully champions the causes of the American workers.

For an agency charged with the awesome responsibility of being the last line of defense of American industry against foreign attack, objectivity and unaccountability are unacceptable. Moving its functions to the Secretary of Commerce would subject those roles to tougher scrutiny by Congressional committees of jurisdiction and, consequently, to the American people. The Secretary would be responsible for all decisions made on behalf of America's workers and would have to answer to the elected representatives of the American people for those determinations.

Finally, Title IV of the Trade Policy Reform Act creates a WTO Review Commission to strengthen the dispute resolution process. Section 301 provisions require the U.S. to bring Section 301 cases involving trade agreements to the dispute settlement procedures established under the agreements. Therefore, U.S. membership in the WTO does not diminish or restrict the ability of the United States to initiate Section 301 cases, but does require it to submit cases involving WTO trade agreements to the WTO for dispute settlement. If the U.S. wins, the loser must comply with the WTO ruling or face retaliation measures.

What happens when the U.S. loses a case in the WTO? Technically, the United States could issue Section 301 trade sanctions, despite any decision made under the WTO dispute resolution process. However, if the United States imposed an unauthorized sanction on a WTO-covered item (e.g. raised the tariff beyond a negotiated rate), the sanctioned country might issue a complaint to the WTO, which might rule against the U.S. The WTO has no real authority to force any nation to change its laws or abide by its rulings. If the U.S. chose to ignore WTO rulings, it would run the risk that other nations would too. In order for the DSU mechanism to work, WTO members, including the U.S. must be willing to "play by the rules."

Specifically, the WTO Review Commission would review the WTO dispute settlement cases adverse to the United States to determine if the WTO had exceeded its authority, which could lead the President to seek changes in WTO dispute settlement rules. For example, should the Commission determine that the WTO's ruling in favor of Japan in the Kodak-Fuji case was due to lack of authority in anti-competitive practices, the Commission could then direct the President to negotiate an anti-competitive trade agreement to expand